The Quiet Partner: Israeli Intelligence and the West's Fight Against Islamist Terrorism
Security & Intelligence · Memo · 7 min read
Executive Summary
Most of Israel's contribution to Western counter-terrorism is invisible by design. When it surfaces, it is usually because a plot was stopped or a leak exposed a source. A string of cases since 2017 shows the scale of what is at stake: an Islamic State plan to bomb a passenger flight from Sydney, a laptop bomb designed to defeat airport screening, and Hamas networks storing weapons in European cities. Israeli intelligence is reported to have played a central part in each. For Britain and its allies, the partnership is an asset that politics now makes harder to discuss openly, and easier to damage carelessly.
Context
Sydney, July 2017. Australian police arrested men in Sydney over a plot, directed by an Islamic State commander in Syria, to smuggle a bomb hidden in a meat grinder onto an Etihad flight to Abu Dhabi. The device never reached the plane. Israeli officials later said that Unit 8200, the signals intelligence arm of the military, had supplied the intelligence that exposed the plot. Australia's then Home Affairs Minister, Peter Dutton, publicly thanked Israel and said the flight had been "almost blown out of the sky".
The laptop bomb, 2017. In early 2017 the United States and Britain restricted large electronic devices in the cabins of flights from several Middle Eastern countries. In May, reports emerged that President Trump had disclosed related intelligence to Russian officials. The New York Times and others reported that the intelligence came from an Israeli operation that had penetrated an Islamic State bomb-making cell. Israel did not confirm the reports. The episode showed both the value of the partnership and its vulnerability: a careless disclosure can put a source at risk.
Hamas in Europe, 2023 to 2025. In December 2023 police in Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands arrested suspected Hamas members accused of plotting attacks on Jewish targets in Europe. In September 2025 Austrian security services found a cache of pistols and explosive materials in Vienna, and in November 2025 Mossad said a joint operation with European services had dismantled a Hamas network building weapons stores and cells across the continent, with arrests in Germany. Much of the detail comes from Israeli statements, but the arrests and seizures were made by European authorities.
Assessment
Why Israel's intelligence matters to the West. Israel sits close to the conflicts that produce jihadist networks: Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and the wider region. It has world-class signals intelligence and deep regional expertise, and its adversaries include organisations Britain itself proscribes in full: Hezbollah since 2019 and Hamas since 2021. Iran is a growing concern for Britain too. MI5's Director General said in 2024 that the service had tracked around twenty potentially lethal Iran-backed plots in the UK since 2022, and Tehran has increasingly used criminal gangs as proxies in Europe. Israel's knowledge of Iranian networks is among the deepest in the world.
Sharing is built on trust. Intelligence partnerships run on the confidence that sources will be protected. Leaks, political disputes and public pressure all make partners more cautious about what they share. Netanyahu's public claim of credit for the Sydney plot, and Trump's disclosure of the laptop intelligence, both show how political incentives can cut across operational ones.
The politics are harder than the substance. The war in Gaza and the 2026 war with Iran have made any association with Israel politically sensitive in Britain and especially in Ireland. Counter-terrorism cooperation can be caught up in that wider argument, though it addresses threats to British citizens on British streets.
Limits and Criticisms
Much of what is publicly known about Israel's role comes from Israeli officials, who have an interest in highlighting it. Netanyahu's statement after the Sydney plot that this was "one of many, many such actions" cannot be independently verified. Intelligence relationships are transactional, and Israel pursues its own interests. Controversies over Israeli-developed surveillance technology used against journalists and activists in several countries also raise legitimate questions. A mature partnership acknowledges these points rather than pretending they do not exist.
Implications
For governments, the task is to keep counter-terrorism cooperation separate from disagreements over wider policy, and to protect it from careless disclosure. For politicians and candidates, Israel will continue to be a high-risk subject, and a clear, defensible position on security cooperation is worth preparing in advance.
What Decision-Makers Should Do
Separate the channels. Treat counter-terrorism cooperation as distinct from diplomatic positions on the conflict.
Protect sources absolutely. Public credit for foiled plots can wait. A burned source cannot be replaced.
Prepare a defensible line. Candidates and organisations should be able to explain their position on security cooperation with Israel in two sentences, before they are asked.
Judge claims on evidence. Value the partnership without accepting every public claim of credit uncritically.
Forward Look
The threat from Islamic State, Hamas networks abroad and Iranian-backed proxies will not ease quickly, and the Iran war has raised the risk of retaliation against Israeli, Jewish and Western targets in Europe. Western services will continue to depend on partners with access they lack. Expect the partnership with Israel to continue largely out of view, and the political argument around it to grow louder.
Bottom Line
The most valuable intelligence partnerships are the ones nobody sees. Israel's has helped keep Western aircraft in the sky and weapons out of European cities. Protecting that relationship is a security decision, whatever view one takes of the wider politics.
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