Prevention First: What Israel's Counter-Terrorism Model Teaches Britain
Security & Intelligence · Memo · 8 min read
Executive Summary
No Western democracy has lived with a terrorist threat as sustained as Israel's. Its response, refined over decades, rests on a simple principle: the most important counter-terrorism work happens before an attack, not after it. Intelligence-led prevention, layered protective security, a culture of learning from every incident and a society trained to recover quickly have made Israel a reference point for security services worldwide. Not all of it can or should be copied. But Britain, facing a persistent Islamist threat, has more to learn than its public debate usually admits.
Context
During the Second Intifada, from 2000 to around 2005, suicide bombings struck Israeli buses, cafés and markets on a scale no European country has experienced. Israel's response combined deep intelligence penetration of militant networks, physical barriers, constant operational pressure on bomb-makers and commanders, and hardened protective security across public life. By the middle of the decade suicide bombings inside Israel had fallen dramatically.
Israelis are also targeted abroad. In July 2012 a bomb on a bus carrying Israeli tourists at Burgas airport in Bulgaria killed five Israelis and the Bulgarian driver. Bulgaria linked the attack to Hezbollah, and the following year the European Union listed Hezbollah's military wing as a terrorist organisation.
Britain's own experience has been shaped by Islamist terrorism since 7/7 in 2005. The Manchester Arena Inquiry found that MI5 had missed a significant opportunity to take action that might have prevented the 2017 bombing. Most recently, on Yom Kippur, 2 October 2025, a man attacked the Heaton Park Synagogue in Manchester. Two worshippers, Melvin Cravitz and Adrian Daulby, died, the second from a police bullet fired during the response. In October 2026 the Home Secretary announced a public inquiry. The attack brought the protection of Jewish communities, and the lessons available from Israel, into sharp focus.
Assessment: the five pillars
Intelligence before force. The Shin Bet's core strength is human intelligence: detailed knowledge of networks, families, recruiters and facilitators, built over years. Signals intelligence, led by the military's Unit 8200, adds reach. The aim is to know who is planning before they act, not to identify them afterwards. A plot disrupted at the stage of recruitment or procurement costs a fraction of one stopped at the door.
Layered security. Israeli protective security does not rely on a single checkpoint. Ben Gurion Airport is the best-known example. Passengers pass through several rings of observation and questioning, with trained staff looking for behaviour and inconsistency rather than relying on scanners alone. Armed guards at schools, shopping centres and bus stations are part of ordinary life. Each layer is designed on the assumption that the one before it may fail.
Speed. Intelligence, operations and protective security are closely joined. A warning can become an arrest or a closed road within hours rather than days.
A learning culture. Every attack and near miss is investigated and the findings fed back into training. Israel treats each incident as data.
Resilience. The Home Front Command trains civilians, schools and local authorities for attack. After an incident, Israeli public spaces reopen quickly. Denying terrorism its psychological effect is treated as part of the security response, not an afterthought.
What Transfers to Britain
Protective security for faith communities and crowded places. The Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Act 2025, known as Martyn's Law after Martyn Hett, who was killed at the Manchester Arena, already moves Britain toward layered security. Israeli practice in training staff to spot hostile reconnaissance and behaviour is directly relevant.
Behavioural detection. Training security staff to read behaviour, not just bags, is cheap relative to technology and lawful when applied to conduct rather than identity.
Clarity about the threat. The 2023 Independent Review of Prevent, led by William Shawcross, concluded that Prevent had not focused enough on Islamism, which remained the primary terrorist threat to the UK. The review was contested by some academics and campaigners. Israel's approach is at least clear about who it is defending against and why.
Learning from every incident. The Manchester Arena Inquiry and the coming Heaton Park inquiry should be treated as Israel treats a near miss: as operational data, acted on quickly, not as a report to be shelved.
What Does Not Transfer
Some of Israel's methods operate within a context of military occupation and emergency law that has no place in Britain. Administrative detention without charge, military courts for Palestinians in the West Bank, targeted killings and profiling based on nationality or ethnicity are criticised by human rights organisations, including Israeli ones, and would be unlawful or politically untenable here. The route of the West Bank barrier was found contrary to international law in a 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. Supporters of Israel's model do not need to defend these to argue for the rest. The strongest case is made by separating them.
Implications
The lesson for Britain is less about technology or force than about mindset. Prevention is cheaper than response. Protective security is a skill, not a fence. Clarity about the threat is a prerequisite for meeting it.
What Decision-Makers Should Do
Treat protective security as a discipline. Venues, faith communities and public bodies should train staff in behavioural awareness, not just install equipment.
Name the threat accurately. Policy built on vague categories produces vague results. Islamist terrorism should be addressed directly, alongside other threats, without euphemism.
Fund the human side of intelligence. Community trust and human sources detect plots that technology misses.
Act on inquiry findings fast. Set deadlines and publish progress.
Draw the legal line clearly. Adopt what works within British law, and say plainly what will not be adopted.
Forward Look
The Islamist threat to Britain is diffuse, often self-starting and increasingly linked to young people radicalised online. Expect continued pressure for stronger protective security, especially for Jewish communities, and continued debate about Prevent. Israeli practice will remain part of that debate, and so will its controversies.
Bottom Line
Israel's counter-terrorism model is not a template to be copied whole. It is a set of hard-earned lessons, and the most important of them, prevention before response and clarity about the threat, apply in Manchester as much as in Jerusalem.
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